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The End of “One Hand”:  The Egyptian Constitutional Declaration and the Rift between the 
“People” and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
Solicited from and accepted by the Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law  
Kristen Stilt1 
 
By some point in the fall of 2011, Egyptians in large numbers no longer viewed the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) as the guardian of the revolution and even 
considered it the revolution’s antagonist.  “The army and the people are one” was a common 
slogan in the early days following Mubarak’s ouster on February 11, 2011, but the situation had 
changed dramatically by the landmark date of October 9, when the military used violence against 
its own citizens, killing approximately twenty-five Christians at a protest outside Maspero, the 
headquarters of the Egyptian state television.2  Violence against protestors continued to escalate, 
leading to the attack by military police on female protesters in Tahrir Square in mid-December 
and the now-famous video of officers ripping off the garments of a young woman on the ground 
and then proceeding to beat her.3   
                                                 
1 Associate Professor of Law and History, Northwestern University. The sources for the study of this contemporary 
topic are mainly online primary source materials, newspaper reports, and personal observations.  The footnotes are 
intended to provide enough information so that the reader can easily locate the source without necessarily 
reproducing the full URL address.  I thank Tamir Moustafa for helpful comments on this essay.  
2 See David Kirkpatrick, “Copts Denounce Egyptian Government over Killings,” The New York Times, October 10, 
2011 (quoting Ayman Nour as stating that “the credit that the military received from the people in Tahrir Square just 
ran out yesterday.”).  
3 David Kirkpatrick, “Mass March by Cairo Women in Protest Over Abuse by Soldiers,” The New York Times, 
December 20, 2011. The event sparked what has been called the “biggest women’s demonstration in modern 
Egyptian history.”  Ibid.  
SCAF’s assertions of political power angered Egyptians in November when it issued 
“supra-constitutional principles” that were intended to control the drafting of a new constitution, 
a task clearly in the jurisdiction of the new parliament according to the March 30 constitutional 
declaration, a document discussed below.  These proposed principles included the provision that 
only SCAF would have access to the details of the military’s budget and that all legislation 
concerning the military would have to be approved by SCAF; the parliament would only control 
the total sum allocated to the military.4 The principles also gave SCAF the power to veto any 
provision of the new constitution that “contradicts the basic tenets of Egyptian state and society 
and the general rights and freedoms confirmed in successive Egyptian constitutions.”5  This 
document of supra-constitutional principles, along with a series of subsequent statements by 
SCAF, also indicated SCAF’s attempt to control the selection of the constitution’s drafters, in 
contradiction to the constitutional declaration.6 
While these events marked key moments in SCAF’s attempts to control the political 
process, SCAF had laid the groundwork for such efforts much earlier in the post-revolutionary 
period. The crucial turning point that showed that SCAF was a self-interested participant, willing 
to ignore the democratic choices of the Egyptian people if necessary to advance its own interests, 
came in the form of the constitutional declaration issued by SCAF on March 30, following the 
constitutional referendum of March 19.  At that time, SCAF’s actions drew little attention by 
foreign observers and even slight response within Egypt, in part due to the fact that it required a 
careful reading of the lengthy constitutional declaration in order to see exactly what SCAF had 
accomplished.  While at that time SCAF surely had not formulated a full plan for the subsequent 
                                                 
4 Yezid Sayigh, “The Specter of ‘Protected Democracy’ in Egypt,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
Dec. 15, 2011. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid; David Kirkpatrick, “Egypt’s Military Retracts Plan to Extend Influence Over Constitution,” The New York 
Times, December 9, 2011. 
transitional period, it was clearly already anticipating that it would want to exercise far more 
control, and for a far greater time, than it had envisioned prior to the constitutional referendum.   
This essay examines the constitutional referendum and then the constitutional declaration 
with the goal of answering several questions.  First, what was the constitutional referendum and 
what were SCAF’s goals in drafting it and submitting it to the public for a vote?  Second, why 
did SCAF subsequently determine that the referendum was not adequate and how did it seek to 
modify and supplement the referendum to produce the declaration?  Third, how did SCAF 
embed in the declaration the basis for its own later assertion of greater power over the political 
and constitutional process?  While the declaration was praised for replacing the 1971 
constitution, a goal of the referendum’s opponents,7 and for providing more clarity about the 
transitional process, the declaration was also the first clear expression by SCAF of its long-term 
ambitions, even as it was not until later in 2011 that the significance of that expression became 
vividly clear.  
 
The Constitutional Referendum 
Soon after assuming control of the country, SCAF suspended the constitution and then 
announced that it had formed a committee of eight men to quickly prepare a slate of 
amendments.  These amendments were intended to modify or remove only the most 
objectionable provisions so that the constitution could remain in force throughout the transition 
period to democratic civilian rule.  The committee was headed by retired judge Tariq al-Bishri, 
who was known for his criticism of the former regime and for his dramatic changes in ideology, 
                                                 
7 Nathan Brown, “Why Nobody Noticed What Egypt’s Opposition Has Won,” The Middle East Channel at 
foreignpolicy.com, March 28, 2011.  
from the left towards a belief in a greater role for Islam in the state.  SCAF also made the 
surprising appointment of Sobhi Saleh to the committee, a prominent figure in the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  No other opposition parties or even leaders of the Tahrir movement were included, 
nor were any women.8  
 Within a short period of time, the committee had completed its task, and the amendments 
were presented to the public for discussion not long before the scheduled referendum on March 
19.9  The substance of the amendments was largely noncontroversial, and the supporters and 
opponents were concerned with the consequences of adopting or rejecting the amendments more 
than with the actual content.10  Only revised Article 75, on the eligibility requirements for 
presidential candidacy, raised substantive concerns, because it supplemented the existing rule 
that a candidate must be an Egyptian of two Egyptian parents by further specifying that the 
candidate’s parents must not have held the citizenship of another nation.  Further, the candidate 
may not be married to a non-Egyptian. 
 The other changes were intended to address the most problematic aspects of the 
constitution.  Mubarak’s notorious Article 76 on the presidential elections—which on its surface 
looked like a multi-candidate process but in practice ensured that only Mubarak would be 
                                                 
8 See David Kirkpatrick and Kareem Fahim, “In Egypt, a Panel of Jurists Is Given the Task of Revising the 
Country’s Constitution,” The New York Times, Feb. 15, 2011; Tamir Moustafa, “Amending the Egyptian 
Constitution,” The Huffington Post, Feb. 25, 2011. 
9 The Arabic text of the referendum as presented to Egyptian voters can be found on the website of the Egyptian 
Supreme Judicial Council at http://referendum.eg/constitutional-amendments/2011-03-11-22-19-08.html.   An 
English-language analysis of the referendum along with a summary of the amendments as adopted can be found in 
Nathan Brown and Michele Dunn, “Egypt’s Draft Constitutional Amendments Answer Some Questions and Raise 
Others,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 1, 2011.  See also Tamir Moustafa, “It’s Not a 
Revolution Yet,” The Middle East Channel at foreignpolicy.com, Feb. 28, 2011. 
10 See Kristen Stilt, “What the Egyptian Constitutional Amendment Referendum is Really About,” available at 
http://www.comparativeconstitutions.org/2011/03/dispatch-from-cairo-what-egyptian.html. 
eligible to run—was finally dismantled and replaced by a much shorter rule.11  A person who 
met the Article 75 criteria could become a presidential candidate in one of three ways: by 
obtaining the support of 30 members of the People’s Assembly or Consultative Assembly; by 
obtaining the support of 30,000 eligible voters from at least 15 governorates, with at least 1,000 
supporters in each governorate; or by being nominated by a political party that won at least one 
seat in either the People’s Assembly or Consultative Assembly in the previous election. The 
composition of the Presidential Election Committee, the body responsible for overseeing 
presidential elections, was altered to consist entirely of judges rather than partisan executive 
officers.  The section of Article 76 requiring that the law detailing the presidential election 
process be submitted to the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) for a pre-promulgation review, 
which was added by Mubarak in the constitution’s 2005 amendments, was retained.12  Article 77 
restored term limits to the presidency, allowing only one re-election. Article 139 required the 
president to appoint a vice-president within 60 days of taking office.  
 Article 88, as amended in 2007, transferred the authority of supervising parliamentary 
elections to an electoral commission that would in practice be controlled by Mubarak.  The new 
amendment returned the task of supervising parliamentary elections to the judges and gave them 
even further supervisory powers.13  Amended Article 93 gave the Court of Cassation the 
authority to decide challenges to contested People’s Assembly races. Article 148 restrained 
substantially the president’s ability to announce a state of emergency by requiring that the 
                                                 
11 For a discussion of the 2005 amendments, which included a lengthy change to Article 76, see Kristen Stilt, 
“Constitutional Authority and Subversion: Egypt’s New Presidential Election System,” 16 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. 
Rev. 335 (2005-06).  Article 76 was further amended in 2007.  
12 See ibid.  The SCC did subsequently review the presidential election law as presented to it by SCAF and decided 
that some provisions were in conflict with the constitutional declaration.  Nathan Brown and Mara Revkin, “Egypt’s 
Supreme Court Ruling on the Presidential Election Law,” Atlantic Council, Jan. 19, 2012.  See infra note 24 and 
accompanying text. 
13 For a discussion of the 2007 amendments, see Nathan Brown, et. al., “Egypt’s Controversial Constitutional 
Amendments,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 23, 2007. 
president’s announcement be approved by a majority of the People’s Assembly within seven 
days.  Even if approved, the state of emergency could last for only six months unless a public 
referendum authorized a longer duration.  Controversial Article 179 on military courts and 
counter-terrorism measures was repealed. 
 Finally, Article 189, on the constitutional amendment process, was altered and new 
provisions were added dealing with the drafting of a new constitution.  The article preserved the 
original method of amending the constitution, whereby either the President or the People’s 
Assembly may propose amendments, which then must be approved by a parliamentary majority 
and in a popular referendum.  Article 189 added a process for the creation of a new constitution 
that gave the People’s Assembly and Consultative Assembly the power to jointly elect a drafting 
commission composed of 100 members.  These two bodies were given six months from their 
first session to elect this drafting commission, and the drafting commission would have six 
months to complete the preparation of the constitution.  The President would then hold a national 
referendum on the constitution within 15 days of the constitution’s completion.   
 In the days before the referendum, lines of support and opposition became clear.14  
Opponents insisted that the revolution ousted both Mubarak and the constitution that was so 
intimately linked to his authoritarian rule, and that SCAF had no authority to revive it in order to 
call for its amendment.  Recognizing the constitution even for the purpose of amending it would 
be an impermissible return to a rejected past. Opponents also complained that the amendment 
drafting was secretive and opaque; it looked too much like a Mubarak-style process to be 
acceptable after the revolution.  The SCAF-selected drafters basically made the same alterations 
                                                 
14 See Kristen Stilt, “What the Egyptian Constitutional Referendum is Really About,” available at 
http://www.comparativeconstitutions.org/2011/03/dispatch-from-cairo-what-egyptian.html.  
as Mubarak himself had offered to make in his final plea to stay in power, as if he were still in 
charge.  Opponents of the referendum also objected to the single-slate style, also used in the 
Mubarak-era, whereby voters had to accept or reject the whole package.  
 Referendum opponents, who included liberals, intellectuals, and the youth who led and 
partook in the revolution, were also concerned that the process that would follow a positive vote 
would privilege pre-existing political groups and organizations, and the former-NDP and the 
Muslim Brotherhood in particular.  While SCAF did not state when parliamentary and 
presidential elections would be held, it implied that they would be as soon as possible after the 
constitution was amended.  The first parliamentary elections in particular would be essential 
because those elected officials would be the ones to oversee the process of writing a new 
constitution.  Opponents of the referendum thought that under an expedited timetable they would 
simply not be able to compete with groups—and namely the Muslim Brotherhood—who were 
already organized and ready to enter into a vigorous election season.  Their preference was to 
focus on the new constitution first, with a broad and representative committee taking the time to 
carefully draft the document that would then guide Egypt through the first fair elections, both 
parliamentary and presidential.  Referendum opponents were willing to tolerate a longer military 
rule in order to prepare the constitution first.  
 Supporters of the referendum, which included the Muslim Brotherhood, said that it dealt 
with the worst provisions of the constitution, making it a document that should be acceptable to 
everyone for the near term, until a new president and parliament could oversee the drafting of a 
new document.  The process that the referendum envisioned would result in the military handing 
over power to a civilian government sooner rather than later, which was essential for national 
stability, they argued.  This appeal to stability was successful among a large section of society 
that may have supported the revolution but did not want the economic and political uncertainty 
that ensued.  As for giving them a substantial edge in the elections, members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood said that they suffered for their opposition to Mubarak during his reign and so any 
advantage they may have post-revolution was fairly earned.  Further, the Muslim Brotherhood 
tried to alleviate fears that it would achieve large electoral successes (while implicitly expressing 
its belief that it could do so) by stating that it would only run in a limited number of 
parliamentary races and would not nominate a presidential candidate.  
 The turnout on referendum day was unprecedented: long lines were typical at some 
polling stations, and many Egyptians interviewed while they were waiting said that it was the 
first time they had voted in an election or referendum because in the Mubarak era the outcome 
was always pre-determined.  According to the head of the judicial committee that supervised the 
process, 41% of Egypt’s 45 million registered voters cast a ballot.  Nationwide, 77% voted in 
favor of the amendments, with the highest concentration of votes cast in opposition located in 
Cairo and Alexandria.15 While there were some reports of electoral irregularities in the process, 
including vigorous campaigning both inside and just outside the stations, in general SCAF was 
credited with conducting a free and fair election. 
The referendum served important functions for SCAF.  First, in terms of the actual 
process on the day of the referendum, SCAF proved itself to be a good faith actor, clearly 
showing that it could and would hold elections in a manner markedly different from those of the 
Mubarak era.  Those who had opposed the referendum quickly followed the announcement of 
the results with statements recognizing the legitimacy of the outcome.  Second, if SCAF’s goals 
                                                 
15 Neil MacFarquhar, “Egyptian Voters Approve Constitutional Amendments,” The New York Times, March 20, 
2011.  
prior to the referendum were to transfer power to a civilian government as soon as possible, then 
the adoption of the amendments served its interests.  A negative vote would have delayed the 
process substantially, and might even have resulted in a lengthy constitutional process first, 
followed by elections, which would have kept SCAF in control for a much longer time.16  Third, 
the referendum validated the role and authority of SCAF itself.  Just by participating, Egyptians 
tacitly recognized SCAF’s power and authority as the interim government.   Even those who 
rejected the amendments validated SCAF’s role not only by voting but also by accepting that if 
their view prevailed, it would have meant a longer tenure for SCAF.  
While supporters and opponents of the referendum were engaged in last minute 
campaigning, SCAF made a surprising announcement: the results of the referendum, positive or 
negative, would be followed by a “constitutional declaration.”  Prior to that announcement, it had 
been expected that if the referendum passed, the constitution would be considered amended and 
returned to force.  In such a case, the declaration was anticipated to be a straightforward 
statement of the timetable for subsequent parliamentary and presidential elections.  If the 
referendum did not pass, SCAF would have to devise a new plan.    
After the announcement of the referendum’s passage, however, Egyptians waited for 
more than a week for the declaration.  During that time, press reports suggested that the 
declaration would include not only the amended provisions adopted in the referendum but also 
other provisions from the constitution that would be needed in the interim period, along with 
some guidance on the political process ahead.  This new bundle would act as a temporary 
constitution until a new constitution could be drafted and approved.  Although SCAF clearly 
                                                 
16 The New York Times reported that “the ruling military council had sought the rapid timetable to ensure its own 
speedy exit from running the country.”   Neil MacFarquhar, “Egyptian Voters Approve Constitutional 
Amendments,” The New York Times, March 20, 2011.  If that was a correct analysis prior to the constitutional 
referendum, the situation changed substantially by March 30.  
supported the referendum it proposed, it seemed to have become convinced late in the process by 
the argument that the 1971 constitution simply could not be salvaged.  Unfortunately, it had just 
held a nation-wide referendum on the opposite premise. 
 
Constitutional Declaration17 
On March 30, 2011, SCAF harnessed the tools of the Tahrir revolutionaries and 
announced the constitutional declaration on its Facebook page.18  A substantial document of 63 
articles, it effectively superseded the 1971 constitution.  Unlike the process of drafting the 
amendments that were proposed in the referendum, which was done by a committee headed by 
Tariq al-Bishri, the drafters of this constitutional declaration were not identified.  The declaration 
consists of articles from the 1971 constitution as amended in the referendum; articles from the 
1971 constitution as amended in the referendum with additional changes made by SCAF; articles 
from the 1971 constitution that were not part of the referendum, some of which were included 
verbatim and some of which were amended by SCAF; and several new articles that specifically 
recognize and give powers to SCAF.   
The result was procedurally and substantively confusing.  According to the 1971 
constitution, amendments to it required approval in a constitutional referendum; SCAF 
recognized and abided by this process when it held the March 19 referendum.  In the days 
                                                 
17 This section is based on Nathan Brown and Kristen Stilt, “A Haphazard Constitutional Compromise,” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, April 11, 2011. 
18 The text of the Constitutional Declaration no longer appears to be available on SCAF’s Facebook page (which is 
still used to make announcements and issue decrees) but can be found on an official Egyptian governmental site, at 
http://www.masr.gov.eg/arabic/laws/constitution/default.aspx.  An English translation was done by the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace and can be found at 
http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/04/01/supreme-council-of-the-armed-forces-constitutional-
announcement.  
following it, however, SCAF on its own initiative put together a document that better suited its 
changing goals and essentially abrogated the constitution whose procedures it had asserted were 
necessary to follow in the referendum process.  In doing so, SCAF transitioned from presenting 
itself as a caretaker of the revolution and the constitution to taking control of the process and 
creating its own constitution, one that, unlike the 1971 text or its final set of amendments as 
adopted in the referendum, made SCAF a constitutional actor with broad powers.  In the process, 
SCAF left most of the 1971 constitution on the drafting room floor, such that many issues are 
simply not provided for in the declaration, with the result that SCAF has significant power and 
discretion. 
The results of the referendum were largely included verbatim in the declaration.  Article 
26 on the eligibility criteria for a presidential election candidate is the same text as Article 75 of 
the constitution as amended by the referendum, and Article 76 as amended by the referendum on 
the presidential election process and the presidential election commission appears in two parts in 
Articles 27 and 28. The term limits for the presidency are presented in Article 29 (formerly 
Article 77 of the constitution) and the requirement that the president appoint a vice-president 
within 60 days of taking office is presented in Article 31 (formerly Article 139 of the 
constitution).  Article 88 of the constitution as amended in the referendum restored full judicial 
supervision to the People’s Assembly election process and appears as Article 39 of the 
declaration.  Amended Article 93, making the Court of Cassation the final authority for disputed 
parliamentary races, appears as Article 40 of the declaration, and amended Article 148, which 
greatly restricts the conditions under which the president may declare a state of emergency, 
appears as Article 59.  The referendum abrogated the controversial Article 189, which allowed 
civilians to be tried in military courts and aggressive surveillance measures; this text does thus 
not appear in the declaration. 
One article as amended by the referendum was further modified by SCAF for inclusion in 
the declaration.  SCAF apparently decided after the referendum that amended Article 189 was 
not sufficiently conducive to the constitutional process and altered its language to make clear that 
the constitutional drafting process could begin—and even conclude—before the presidential 
elections were held.  While not explicit, the referendum anticipated that both presidential and 
parliamentary elections would be held before constitutional drafting commenced.  The 
declaration, in article 60, added new language to make clear that it is SCAF, and not the 
president, that convenes a joint session of parliament, within six months of the elections for both 
houses, in order for parliament to elect the 100-member drafting commission.  In doing so, 
SCAF confirmed that the process could begin in the absence of a president.   
Further, the referendum had amended Article 189 to state that the president should 
present the new constitution within fifteen days of its completion to the voters in a referendum.  
Thus, a president should be in place at least by the time the drafting was completed.  In Article 
60 of the declaration, SCAF explicitly altered that language to provide merely that the 
constitution will be presented to the voters in a referendum within 15 days of its completion, 
without specifying who should do the presenting.  The constitution takes effect from the day on 
which it is so approved.   Thus, the president does not have to be elected by this time; rather, 
SCAF could be the entity that arranges for the referendum on the new constitution.  
SCAF’s revisions to Article 189 disregarded the results of the referendum, suggesting 
that SCAF was not committed to a democratic or even coherent constitutional process.  In the 
Mubarak era, constitutional amendments were forced upon the populace through referendums 
that were clearly fraudulent; here, SCAF altered the results of a referendum that was considered 
free and fair.  The alteration was not merely technical.  The declaration does not pressure SCAF 
to return the country to civilian control since the presidential election process can be delayed 
indefinitely without affecting the constitutional process.  In a separate new article, the 
declaration provides that SCAF’s role, as detailed in the declaration, continues until elections for 
both houses of parliament and for president have been completed and they have all assumed their 
duties.19  The delay of presidential elections translates into prolonged rule of SCAF. 
This revision to Article 189 drew surprisingly little criticism at the time.20  By the fall of 
2011, the implications became clear: SCAF may remain in power throughout the constitutional 
drafting process, which not only prolongs SCAF’s rule but, more importantly, gives SCAF an 
opportunity to exert influence on the drafters.  Even if SCAF does not succeed in actually 
appointing members to the drafting committee, it will still have the opportunity to affect the 
drafting and even achieve its own substantive goals in the new constitution.  And indeed, 
Egyptian protestors in late 2011 and early 2012, realizing SCAF’s intentions to delay presidential 
elections, began pressuring SCAF to hold them as soon as possible.21  As of late January 2012, 
SCAF’s plan does seem to be to hold presidential elections only after the constitution has been 
approved and to attempt to satisfy its critics by rushing the entire process rather than by putting 
the presidential elections before the constitution.  
                                                 
19 Art. 61. 
20 An exception is Nathan Brown and Kristen Stilt, “A Haphazard Constitutional Compromise,” supra note 17.  
21 Nathan Brown has called the presidential election process as expressed in the constitutional declaration one of the 
“landmines” in Egypt’s constitutional roadmap.   Nathan Brown, “Landmines in Egypt’s Constitutional Roadmap,” 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Dec. 7, 2011. 
The articles in the declaration dealing with fundamental rights and freedoms are taken 
from the 1971 constitution verbatim, guaranteeing, for example, equal protection of law and 
freedom of expression, although it is not clear how these protections will be enforced in practice.  
In the Mubarak era, legislation eroded the rights provided in the constitution, undermining 
substantially their plain meaning, and much of this legislation appears to remain in force.22  The 
SCC had been willing to strike down in the past some legislation that was backed by the 
regime.23  Presumably, the SCC will continue to play this role under the constitutional 
declaration, but appeals to the SCC take time to make their way through the court process.   As it 
was tasked to do under Article 28 of the referendum, the SCC has already considered the 
“constitutionality” of the presidential election law and identified several provisions that 
contradict the declaration.  By doing so, the SCC has implicitly recognized the declaration as the 
current constitution.24  Whether the SCC will consider other claims based on the declaration is 
not yet known.  
The logic of taking other articles from the constitution and inserting them into the 
declaration is not obvious.  SCAF maintained the requirement that half of all parliamentary 
deputies be either “workers” or “peasants”; this Nasser-era idea was determined by Sadat to be 
an essential component of the 1971 constitution although it was criticized as unnecessary by 
some in the course of drafting that constitution. By 2011, it seemed clearly outdated.  SCAF’s 
reasons for including it are unclear, but it certainly assisted parties (chiefly the Muslim 
                                                 
22 Article 62 of the declaration states that all laws and regulations remain in force, but they may be amended or 
abrogated according to the procedures provided for in the declaration.  Article 56 of the declaration, which is one of 
the new articles created by SCAF, gives SCAF authority over legislation.  The People’s Assembly also has some 
legislative power, creating a tension between it and SCAF in this regard; Nathan Brown calls this tension one of the 
landmines of the constitutional process.  Ibid.  
23 See generally Tamir Moustafa, The Struggle for Constitutional Power (2007).  
24 Nathan Brown and Mara Revkin, “Egypt’s Supreme Court Ruling on the Presidential Election Law,” supra  note 
12. 
Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party) in the parliamentary elections that already had an 
extensive list of possible candidates to call upon who could fit into the two categories. 
In another surprising move, SCAF tinkered with one of the ideological provisions of the 
constitution, even though it had told al-Bishri’s committee that they were beyond the scope of 
the amendment process.  Article Two of the 1971 constitution, which provides that Islam is the 
religion of the state and the principles of the Islamic Sharia are the main source of legislation, 
was included in the declaration as its Article Two, but SCAF amended Article Five, dealing with 
political activity and party formation, on its own initiative for inclusion as the declaration’s 
Article Four.  As amended in 2007, Article Five banned the pursuit of political activities or the 
formation of political parties with a religious frame of reference or on a religious basis. The 
“religious frame of reference” language was clearly intended to further ensure that the Muslim 
Brotherhood could not become a political party, since that was the language that the Brotherhood 
used to describe itself.25  SCAF, on its own, deleted the broader “religious frame of reference” 
language, paving the way for the registration of Muslim Brotherhood parties such as the 
Freedom and Justice Party.26  
In a series of new articles, SCAF provided for itself in the declaration.  Article 56 lists 
SCAF’s powers, which are essentially a combination of executive and legislative functions.  
SCAF’s range of authority includes issuing legislation; determining state policy, including the 
budget; appointing the appointed members of the People’s Assembly; convening and adjourning 
the People’s Assembly and Consultative Assembly; representing the state externally, including 
the power to enter into treaties; appointing ministers, including the prime minister; appointing 
                                                 
25 See Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron, “The 2007 Constitutional Amendments in Egypt and their Implications on the 
Balance of Power,” 22 Arab Law Quarterly 397-417; 411 (2008). 
26 For a thorough guide to the new political parties and coalitions in Egypt, see the online source Jadaliyya at 
www.jadaliyya.com. 
state employees; issuing pardons or reducing the level of punishment; and other responsibilities 
as determined by the president.  This list created a tension between SCAF and the People’s 
Assembly, since Article 33 specified that the People’s Assembly has the power to legislate and 
determine state policy.27 
SCAF also added into the declaration some further details for the subsequent political and 
constitutional process.  Article 41 stated that procedures for elections to the People’s Assembly 
and Consultative Assembly would begin within six months from the date of the declaration, but 
the term “procedures” did not suggest that the elections would be concluded within that time.  
And indeed they did not: the People’s Assembly elections were held over three days, from 
November 2011 to January 2012, which allowed for judicial oversight at the polling stations, and 
Consultative Assembly elections are scheduled for January-February 2012.28 
 
Conclusions 
The transition from the constitutional referendum to the declaration is a crucial moment 
for understanding the development of SCAF’s position and power.  While on one hand, as a 
document for the transition period, the declaration provided a little more practical guidance than 
would have been in the amended 1971 constitution per the referendum by giving a rough 
timetable for elections and, importantly, by specifying the powers of SCAF itself.  This addition 
satisfied concerns of those who said that as an extra-constitutional actor all of SCAF’s decisions 
could later be challenged as unconstitutional under the 1971 constitution. A path towards civilian 
                                                 
27 Nathan Brown referred to this tension as one of the constitutional landmines.  Brown, “Landmines in Egypt’s 
Constitutional Roadmap,” supra note 21. 
28 For a thorough guide to the Egyptian parliamentary elections, see the online source Jadaliyya at 
www.jadaliyya.com.  
rule was provided for in the declaration, and the fundamental rights that SCAF selected to 
include from the 1971 constitution are ones that belong in a constitution for a democratic society.   
Yet, the process by which the declaration was produced, and the substantive alterations 
and additions, undercut at least some of these benefits and set the scene for the struggles that 
unfolded in late 2011.  Insofar as voters were told that passage of the referendum would result in 
the continued force of the 1971 constitution, as amended, SCAF’s subsequent behavior shows 
that Egypt is not currently on the other side of the “threshold beyond which no one can intervene 
to reverse outcomes of the formal democratic process,” as Adam Przeworski has argued is a 
crucial moment in the transition to democratic rule.29  The unilateral issuance of the declaration 
is troubling because it followed a popular referendum the outcome of which was disregarded.  
Once the referendum was held, SCAF lost its ability to hold another one on the declaration 
without provoking voters to ask whether SCAF really intended to be bound by the results the 
second time.  
If SCAF had the power to abrogate the 1971 constitution and write a constitutional 
declaration for the interim period, why did it start down the path of amending the constitution?  
One explanation is simply SCAF’s lack of experience with governance, forcing it to learn day by 
day.  The amendments may have seemed like a good idea to SCAF in late February but a month 
later the shortcomings of that approach became evident, and SCAF may even have become 
convinced by the arguments of those who opposed the referendum that the 1971 constitution 
could not and should not be revived.  Another important explanation for the change, as 
                                                 
29 Adam Przeworski, “Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts,” in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds., 
Constitutionalism and Democracy 62 (1988).  
articulated in this essay, was SCAF’s realization that it was not as eager to turn the country over 
to civilian rule as it had thought from the outset of the referendum process.   
The changes SCAF made to the constitutional drafting process, as well as provisioning 
for itself in the declaration, show when and how it decided that it wanted to play a significant 
role in shaping post-revolutionary Egypt.  In order to preserve its own power and future 
autonomy, SCAF was willing to extend its rule to ensure that result.  As of early 2012, it is 
certainly anticipated that tense negotiations among SCAF, the elected parliamentarians, the 
constitutional drafters, and the populace over significant issues such as the military’s significant 
economic privileges will dominate political life in the course of the year, and that SCAF will not 
hand over power to a civilian government without gaining assurances that many aspects of the 
military will remain outside of civilian oversight.  SCAF, initially considered the guardian of the 
revolution, became determined to prioritize its own interests of maintaining the same status and 
privileges for the military enjoyed during the Mubarak regime over the interests of the public 
that initially welcomed it as guardian.   
 
